Standfirst: What issues has Colombia faced under President Gustavo Petro (since Aug 2022)? We map the data: coca cultivation and cocaine output rising, lethal attacks like August’s Cali bombing, sliding approval ratings, and a sharp diplomatic break with Washington over tariffs, aid and U.S. boat strikes—plus context on his M-19 past.
TL;DR
- Coca up under Petro: UNODC says coca area rose 10% in 2023 (253,000 ha, from 230,000 ha in 2022) while potential cocaine output jumped ~53% to ~2,664 t. (UNODC press)
- Security shocks: A truck bomb hit Cali’s Marco Fidel Suárez air base on Aug 21, 2025 (≥5 dead; dozens injured); a separate attack downed a police helicopter in Antioquia the same day. (ABC, El País)
- “Total Peace” strain: Ceasefires with ELN/FARC dissidents suffered violations; analysts say armed groups exploited truces to expand. (Oxan, Good Authority)
- U.S. rupture: On Oct 19–21, 2025, Trump threatened/announced aid cuts and tariff hikes; Bogotá recalled its ambassador. (WSJ, Reuters, ABC)
- Boat strikes anger: Petro condemned U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean, saying Colombians may have been killed. (AP via ABC)
- Approval slide: Poll snapshots in Aug 2025 show ~37% approval / ~58–62% disapproval. (Infobae on Invamer, Colombia One roundup)
At a glance — the issues during Petro’s tenure
| Issue | What the data/news show | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Coca & cocaine | 253,000 ha coca in 2023 (+10% YoY); potential cocaine ~2,664 t (+53%). UNODC | Higher earnings for armed groups; pressure on security & U.S. ties. |
| Ceasefires & violence | Analysts: armed groups abused truces to expand; ceasefires repeatedly violated; talks suspended/resumed on and off. Oxan, Good Authority | Undermines Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy; increases civilian risk. |
| Major attacks | Cali air-base truck bomb (Aug 21, 2025): ≥5 dead; twin attack downed police helicopter in Antioquia. ABC, El País | Signals a security relapse into high-impact urban attacks. |
| U.S. relations | Trump aid cut/tariff moves (Oct 2025); ambassador recalled. WSJ, Reuters, ABC | Threatens funding for counternarcotics, rural programs & trade. |
| Opinion climate | Low approvals in 2025 (≈34–37%); high disapproval (≈58–64%). Infobae/Invamer | Weak political capital → harder reforms/peace enforcement. |
| Background | Petro is a former M-19 guerrilla who entered democratic politics; elected in 2022. Britannica | Frames partisan debates on his security/drug policies. |
Findings
- Coca cultivation and cocaine output increased during Petro’s tenure.
UNODC: 253,000 ha of coca in 2023 (+10% YoY), potential cocaine ~2,664 t (+53%). Growth concentrated in southwest departments with dissident presence.
Context: The upswing started before Petro but continued in 2022–23; yearly surveys mean policy effects lag. (UNODC executive summaries) (UNODC) - Peace talks and ceasefires have struggled, enabling more criminal space.
Independent analyses say armed groups exploited truces (e.g., to tax coca, recruit, move fighters). (Oxan; Good Authority) - High-impact attacks surged back into headlines—Cali being the emblem.
On Aug 21, 2025, a truck bomb outside Marco Fidel Suárez air base killed at least five and wounded dozens; a separate attack downed a police helicopter in Antioquia. (ABC, El País) - Relations with Washington have sharply deteriorated.
After disputes over migration flights and “narco-boat” strikes, Trump threatened/announced aid suspension and tariffs on Oct 19–21, 2025; Colombia recalled its ambassador. (WSJ; Reuters; ABC) - Petro’s reaction to U.S. boat strikes is a key flashpoint.
He says Colombians may have been killed in at least one strike; the White House disputes this. (AP via ABC, Straits Times) - Public support has been weak.
Mid-2025 polls capture ~37% approval vs ~58–62% disapproval. (Infobae on Invamer; Colombia One poll roundup) - Legislative headwinds add to the perception of drift.
A flagship health-care reform was rejected in the Senate committee (Apr 2024) and later partially pushed by decree, drawing legal/political fire. (Reuters summary via ST; Colombia One)
Important: Where numbers vary (e.g., Cali casualty totals, strike tallies), we show conservative “at least” figures and cite multiple outlets.
How to read claims online
- Primary source? (UN/official docs; AP/Reuters/WSJ; court filings)
- Fair comparisons? Like-for-like time windows, regions, and age groups
- What’s the design? Causality study or signal-finding/monitoring only
Method notes
- For coca metrics, we rely on UNODC annual surveys (area & potential output). For security and diplomacy, we prioritise AP/Reuters/WSJ/ABC/El País and respected analysis outlets on ceasefires. (UNODC)
- Causation caution: Increases in coca predate Petro, but continued through 2023; ceasefire effects are debated—hence we quote analytical sources and keep wording precise. (Good Authority)
Confidence label
✅
High — Coca figures are UNODC; the Cali attacks, aid/tariff announcements, and ambassador recall are confirmed by AP/Reuters/WSJ/ABC; polling snapshots are consistent across outlets. Disputed elements (boat-strike nationality/casualties) are flagged as claims with opposing responses noted. (UNODC)
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